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ETHICS AND SPORT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPORT: ATHLETES, LAW AND ARBITRATION
By
Zachary Burley*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

Ethics and Sport: Dispute Resolution in Sport: Athletes, Law and Arbitration
(“Dispute Resolution in Sport”) is authored by David McArdle, a senior lecturer in the
School of Law at University of Stirling, United Kingdom.1 McArdle wrote the book to
offer a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between arbitration and
litigation as it applies to disputes arising in sports.2 Further, the book provides guidance
on significant current issues and best practices for students, researchers, and practitioners
working in various fields of sports law.3 McArdle’s goal was to explore some of the key
legal, arbitral, and policy developments that have impacted athletes’ participation rights,
with a specific focus on North America and the European Union.
This book is an excellent tool for sports law practitioners because it offers
analysis of the most contemporary legal issues in sports. Practitioners can use this book
as a tool to educate themselves on present-day dispute resolution issues facing sports in
America and Europe. While this book is slightly expensive at around $120, which may be
too costly for students, it is a reasonable price for practitioners.
II.  

OVERVIEW

Dispute Resolution in Sport is comprised of ten chapters which can be grouped
into four parts. Part One discusses issues specific to the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (“NCAA”), including recent student-athlete unionization efforts, and the
NCAA’s governance structure and its impact on dispute resolution. Part Two focuses on
the interaction of law and arbitration in sports. This section ultimately looks at the
relationship between sporting entities (be they teams, leagues, or federations), the Court
of Arbitration for Sports (“CAS”), and the traditional judicial system. Part Three
discusses various sports topics as they apply to law and arbitration in the United States
such as amateurism, collective bargaining, antitrust claims, competitive balance, union
strikes, lockouts, and decertification. Part Four focuses on issues effecting European
sports such as homegrown player rules, salary caps, financial “fair play”, young
participants in sports, and others topics.
*

Zachary Burley is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2016 Juris
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
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DAVID MCARDLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPORT: ATHLETES, LAW AND ARBITRATION (2014).

2

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at i.
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III.

PART ONE, CHAPTER ONE: WHITHER THE NCAA?

Chapter One examines the initiative taken in January 2014 by football players at
Northwestern University in what was been called the first move towards the unionization
of college student-athletes.4 McArdle feels that the filling of union cards with the
National Labor Relations Board by the student-athletes is a “bargaining-chip” that is
principally designed to secure student-athletes greater rights in relation to the revenue
from broadcasting, as well as better treatment for students not receiving beneficial
scholarships.5 McArdle uses these examples to show that the United States’ sporting
model is characterized by a far more widespread resort to law than the European Union’s
resort to alternative dispute resolution.6
The remaining sections of Chapter One focus on the governance and oversight
problems that have tarnished the reputation of the NCAA’s current regime such as the
Jerry Sandusky scandal and self-reporting standards.7 The NCAA is perceived as having
an inadequate governance structure that renders it “unable, or unwilling, to confront any
issues that stray much beyond the basics of who gets to play and under what conditions.”8
McArdle illustrates the perceived inadequacies through the example of the
Pennsylvania State University’s (“Penn State”) child abuse scandal involving Jerry
Sandusky.9 The NCAA sanctioned Penn State by fining the University $60 million (the
equivalent to one year’s gross revenue from the football program), a four-year postseason
ban for the football team, and a four-year reduction in the number of grants that the

4

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 4.

5

Id.; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (former and present student
athletes challenge the NCAA's rules restricting compensation for elite men's football and basketball
players. The student-athletes seek to challenge the set of rules that bar student-athletes from receiving a
share of the revenue that the NCAA and its member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the
student-athletes' names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live game telecasts, and other footage. The
student-athletes’ contend that these rules violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.).
6

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 5.

7

Id. at 6.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 6-8; see Ian Simpson, TIMELINE: Jerry Sandusky sex abuse case. C HI. T RIB ., (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-09/business/sns-rt-usa-pennstate-timeline-update-1l1e8l99cm20121009_1_coaches-association-names-sandusky-university-police-interview-sandusky-jerry-sandusky
(discussing timeline of Jerry Sandusky’s sexual abuse on male children victims and subsequent arrest, trial,
and sentencing, as well as the steps taken by the NCAA in responding to this scandal).
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university could offer football players.10 McArdle argues that the sanctions passed down
from the NCAA to Penn State had no external oversight and failed to punish those truly
responsible for the crimes committed and instead punished most directly the innocent
past, present, and future student-athletes of the University.11 The punishments primarily
affected Penn State’s football program and its current coaches and players and failed to
punish in any real way those who were truly responsible for the crimes.12 Perhaps this
occurred because the NCAA felt compelled to act, but its infrastructure and disciplinary
powers were unequipped for the challenge it faced.13
Finally, McArdle discuss the NCAA’s governance structure which is based on its
contractual relationship with its more than 1,200 US university and college members.14
As a private association, its members jointly and contractually agree upon the rules of
membership and determine sanctions applicable to its members in the event of a
violation.15 This contractual structure has traditionally given the NCAA some shelter
from judicial oversight.16
Part One does an excellent job at discussing the fundamental troubles regarding
the NCAA regime. McArdle uses the Jerry Sandusky scandal to illustrate that the current
NCAA governance structure is inadequate at its oversight authority and often punishes
students and coaches disproportionately when attempting to regulate institutional
behavior. When viewing this book’s layout as a whole, this chapter would have been
better swapped with chapter two for two reasons: chapter two is a better introduction to
courts and arbitration as they apply to sports and chapter one would have fit nicely
alongside chapters three through six (Part Three) discussing dispute resolution in the
United States.
10

MCARDLE, supra note 1 at 7; see generally BINDING CONSENT DECREE IMPOSED BY THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ACCEPTED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
http://www.ncaa.com/content/penn-state-conclusions (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (other sanctions include a
five year probationary period, vacation of the football team’s wins from 1998 to 2011, a waiver of transfer
rules and grant-in-aid retention which allowed Penn State football players to transfer to another school and
not be forced to sit out a year, and allowing the NCAA to penalize individuals after the conclusion of
criminal proceedings).
11

Id. at 7.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 9; see also Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement, and
Infractions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them and the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND . J. ENT . &
T ECH . L . 257, 267 (2010) (discussing the NCAA as a private association of four-year post-high-school
educational institutions that derives its authority from the member institutions that created it).
15

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 9.

16

Id.; see Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding the NCAA restrictions on
students’ endorsement and media activities); but see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding NCAA rules limiting the salaries of assistant coaches violated antitrust laws because those rules
served no legitimate sporting purpose and was a horizontal agreement to fix prices).
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IV. PART TWO, CHAPTER TWO: THE

COURTS, THE

CAS

AND THE

“PROFESSIONAL”

ATHLETE

The main focus of Chapter Two places importance on sporting entities seeking to
limit the courts’ opportunities to review their decisions. Of all the chapters in Dispute
Resolution in Sport, this chapter does the best job of accomplishing McArdle’s objective
of understanding the relationship between arbitration and litigation as it applies to
disputes arising in sports. The chapter demonstrates it is difficult for sporting entities to
completely shield themselves against the possibility of court review and oversight.
McArdle demonstrates the importance of the CAS and the courts having the authority to
participate in independent oversight of sporting activities.17
This concept is best illustrated through Oscar Pistorius’ Olympic eligibility battle
with the International Association of Athletics Federation (“IAAF”).18 Oscar Pistorius
won gold medals in the 100, 200, and 400-meter class-43 events at the 2006 Athletics
World Championships using his prosthetic legs while competing against athletes without
disabilities.19 Pistorius then sought to be considered for selection in South Africa’s 2008
Olympic team in the 400-meter and the 4 x 400-meter relay.20 Shortly after his Athletics
World Championships success, however, the IAAF changed its rules on “technical aids”
specifically to prohibit the use of devices that use springs, wheels, “or any other element
that provides the user with an advantage over another athlete not using such a device.”21
Following the rule change, Pistorius completed several tests for the IAAF to further
perform research on his situation.22 Based on these tests, the IAAF Council ruled that
Pistorius was ineligible for Olympic selection because his prosthetic legs permitted him
to exert less energy than able-bodied athletes and constituted an advantage over them.23
Thereafter, Pistorius appealed the IAAF decision to the CAS, asking the
arbitrators to vacate the IAAF decision and rule that he could participate in IAAFsanctioned events.24 The CAS declared that Pistorius was eligible to compete in IAAF17

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 19.

18

See generally CAS 2008/A/1480 Pistorius v. The Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (discussing the eligibility
for an athlete with disabilities to compete in IAAF-sanctioned events alongside able-bodied athletes).
19

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 19.

20

Id.

21

Id; see also IAAF Introduces Rule Regarding “Technical Aids”, http://www.iaaf.org/news/news/iaafcouncil-introduces-rule-regarding-techni (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
22

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 19-20 (the tests included the “Rome Observations” involving video
recordings of his performance at a specially organized race and the “Cologne Tests” involving analysis
conducted by personnel at the German Sport University); see also O SCAR P ISTORIUS, B LADE R UNNER : M Y
S TORY ¶ 45 (2009).
23

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 20.

24

Id.
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sanctioned events because he was not in violation of the new IAAF rule relating to
technical aids on several grounds.25
The need for oversight and review of sporting bodies’ decisions was further
proven as necessary by the IAAF’s actions following the CAS ruling.26 The IAAF
remained very hostile toward Pistorius as evidenced by IAAF officials stating that “[they]
prefer that (South Africa) do(es)n’t select him for reasons of athletes’ safety” without
advancing any evidence in support of that argument.27 Without the oversight of the CAS,
sporting entities would be left to their own devices, possibly to the detriment of athletes
like Pistorius.
McArdle then shifts his focus from the need for external oversight of sporting
bodies’ decisions to the interplay between arbitration and courts in providing that
oversight. McArdle discusses the nature of arbitral awards as binding on the parties that
are ineligible for appeal by courts. This can be accomplished in one of three ways. First,
national laws can be drafted to explicitly recognize arbitral awards as valid and can
eliminate or limit the scope for national courts to set them aside. Second, contracting
parties to an arbitration have freedom of contract and can agree to exclude national laws.
Last, the legitimacy of an arbitral award can apply independently of national legal
systems and the wishes of the contracting parties.28 What makes sport arbitration unique
is a distinction between international sports law and global sports law.29 Among other
distinctions, international sports law can be applied by national courts whereas global
sports law suggests a claim of protection from national law.30 The simplest way to view
the distinction between international sports law and global sports law is to think of global
sports law as having a “cloak of continued self-regulation by international sports
federations” and as a right for non-intervention by both national legal systems and by
international sports law.31 McArdle argues that decisions by sports-specific arbitrators
such as CAS arbitrators are prime examples of a move toward global sports law because
while their judgments can in theory be subject to review by courts, appeals to courts very
rarely happen in practice.32
25

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 22 (the CAS criticized the IAAF for several reasons including that the
IAAF tests did not take into account Pistorius’ performance during the start or “acceleration” phase of a
race, Pistorius’ scientist being basically blocked from participation in the tests, egregious flaws in the IAAF
Council’s voting procedure, and the timing of implementing this rule especially because the prosthetics
used by Pistorius had been used for over 10 years).
26

Id.

27

Id. at 22-23.

28

Id. at 24.

29

Id.

30

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 24; see also Foster, supra note 24, at 1-2 (discussing the differences
between international sports law and global sports law).
31

See Foster, supra note 24, at 2.

32

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 24.
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While CAS decisions rarely are appealed, in theory this appeal procedure to
national legal systems is more a function of international sports law and not global sports
law. Sporting authorities cannot entirely protect themselves from the courts’ appellate
function and the intrinsic supervisory jurisdiction.33
As far as enforceability of arbitral awards, sports arbitration does not face the
challenge of enforcement in the manner that commercial arbitration does.34 This is best
illustrated through the example of a Swiss football club, Sion FC. Sion FC disregarded a
CAS ruling which cut off the club’s eligibility to sign transfer players.35 After Sion FC
signed the players, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”), the
international governing body for football, demanded that the Swiss Football Association
(“Swiss FA”), the domestic governing body, punish Sion FC.36 Because of the
relationship between FIFA and Swiss FA, Swiss FA was compelled to comply with
FIFA’s demands or face severe sanctions, thus creating a system where compliance with
arbitral awards is honored.37 This power though a lack of resistance to arbitral award
enforcement is a central aspect of both international and global sports law.
This chapter does an excellent job of demonstrating a courts’ readiness to identify
that sports disputes are best resolved by sporting organizations themselves— or, if need
be, sports-specific arbitrators—such as the CAS, rather than by the courts. No matter
how securely drafted the terms of a private contract may be, however, the supervisory
jurisdiction of courts cannot be completely expelled.38
V. PART THREE, CHAPTERS THREE THROUGH SIX : UNITED STATES DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN SPORT

In Chapter Three, McArdle concentrates on the structure of US “amateur” sports,
with particular respect to the role of the courts and arbitral bodies in overseeing
determinations that impact Olympic eligibility.39
The most prominent recent legislation regarding US oversight of its Olympic
activities is the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1998 (“OASA”)40
33

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 26.

34

Id. at 27; see generally Hong-Lin Yu, Is the Territorial Link Between Arbitration and Country of Origin
Established by Articles I and V Being Distorted by the Application of Article VIII of the New York
Convention?, 5 INT ’L ARB . L . REV . 196 (2002) (discussing enforcement of arbitral awards in commercial
arbitration).
35

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 27.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 35.

39

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 36.
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which gave a private body, the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”), monopoly
status and specified requirements for its member national governing bodies for individual
sports.41 The decisions of the USOC and the individual sport governing bodies appointed
by the USOC have intermittently given rise to court proceedings.42 These cases show
that, in the US, the sports experts in the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)
rather than the courts, are the central figures because judicial challenges to the AAA’s
decisions are hardly realistic.43
Arbitration does not have unlimited authority, however, evidenced prior to the
2000 Olympic Games in Greco-Roman wrestling.44 A dispute arose over who would
represent the US in the men’s 69-76kg category after Keith Sieracki defeated Matt
Lindland in the final eliminator, but Lindland immediately challenged the officials’
decision claiming that Sieracki used an unlawful hold and also attempted to flee a hold, in
violation of the applicable rules.45 After exhausting his internal appeals procedures,
Lindland further appealed to the AAA and initiated an arbitration proceeding in Chicago,
arguing that USA Wrestling did not provide procedures for the prompt and equitable
resolution of disputes.46 The Chicago arbitrator agreed with Lindland and ordered a
rematch as opposed to having the appeal committee reconsider the match.47

40

Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529 (1998) (this legislation was
also important for several reasons including the fact that amateurism is no longer a requirement for
competing in most international sporting event, the expansion of the United States Olympic Committee’s
role to include the Paralympic Games, increased athlete representation, and protected the United States
Olympic Committee from lawsuits arising out of athletes’ right to participate in the Olympic Games).
41

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 36.

42

Id. at 36-37.

43

Id. at 37; see generally DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (holding that the USOC had the authority to decide not to send an American team to the Olympics
and confirmed the USOC’s exalted position); also see generally Armstrong v. Tygart, 886 F. Supp. 2d 572
(W.D. Tex. 2012) (Armstrong challenged the US Anti-Doping Agency’s authority to require him settle
disputes through AAA arbitration and were a restriction on his due process, but the court held that due
process was satisfied by AAA arbitration rules if applied reasonably).
44

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 49.

45

Id. (Lindland protested according to the general procedures of USA Wrestling to a protest committee
which refused to overturn the officials’ decisions. Lindland further appealed to the USA Wrestling’s
Standing Committee for the Greco-Roman discipline, but they ruled against him citing that mat officials’
decisions were non-reviewable.).
46

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 49; see Lindland v. USA Wrestling, AAA No. 30 190 00443 00 (Aug. 9,
2000) (D. Burns, Arb.) (Sieracki was not able to be a party to the arbitration and present his arguments
under the OASA which caused the spiral of court and arbitral proceedings).
47

Id.
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Before the rematch occurred, Sieracki filed for his own arbitration in Denver
against USA Wrestling seeking to secure his nomination.48 The rematch occurred, under
protest by Sieracki, and Lindland won, but USA Wrestling merely made Lindland an
alternate and left Sieracki as the nominee.49 This resulted in a series of litigation that
culminated in Lindland being named the US nominee just two weeks before the Olympic
Games after a total of thirteen separate court and arbitral hearings.50 As a result of all of
the proceedings between Lindland, Sieracki, and USA Wrestling, the USOC bylaws were
amended to allow any athlete submitting an eligibility dispute to the AAA to supply a list
of persons whom he or she believes may be adversely affected by the outcome, to allow
for a single arbitration proceeding.51
These events illustrate that courts can provide oversight to arbitral proceedings.
More importantly, however, they demonstrate that courts may be unable to handle
sporting decisions in a satisfactory manner.52 Generally, US courts have readily deferred
to sports’ own dispute resolution systems, not only because OASA obliges the courts to
do so, but also because they appear to be unable to handle sports disputes in an effective
and efficient manner.53
Chapter Four focuses on the strength of US professional sports players’ unions.54
Players unions, specifically in the four major US professional sports – football, baseball,
basketball, and hockey, have been able to negotiate with their respective leagues and
establish mandatory recourse to arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution that
prevent many disputes from going to court.55 Because of the power of the players’ unions
in these sports, they have been able to secure dispute resolution structures that are more
favorable to their athletes/members than those within Europe or athletes operating under
the purview of OASA.56
McArdle argues that US professional sports players’ unions have been able to
attain favorable outcomes for their athletes because they have gained authority and
influence of their incredibly high membership levels and the financial power. High
48

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 49; see Sieracki v. USA Wrestling, AAA No. 30 190 00483 00 (Aug. 24,
2000) (A.B. Campbell, Arb.)
49

Id.

50

Id.; see Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Ass’n,, 230 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Ass’n, 227 F.3d 1000 (7 th Cir. 2000).
51

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 50.

52

Id. at 53.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 56.

55

Id.

56

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 56.
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membership levels and financial power allows players’ unions to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements from a position of great strength, whether that power stems from
the threat of strike action, decertification, or lockouts.57
The emergence of players’ unions in professional sports has led to several distinct
arenas of concerted action, the most important being the mandatory use of arbitration to
resolve grievance and salary disputes that arise out of the collective bargaining
agreements.58 The mandatory route to arbitration customarily provides for the use of an
independent arbitrator to resolve labor-related disputes.59
Another interesting side-effect of collective bargaining in US professional sports
is the emergence of individuals who are independent of both the league and the players’
union and who possess far-reaching powers to rule on the application of the collective
bargaining agreements’ terms.60 The role of the Commissioner dates its inception to the
gambling scandal by the 1919 World Series, when the Chicago White Sox allegedly took
bribes to “throw” the game so gamblers could make large returns on their bets.61 Owners
wanted to eradicate the negative perception of their sport and vested the powers in a
single Commission instead of the previous body that had multiple owners, some of which
were allegedly involved in the 1919 World Series scandal.62 The owners agreed to waive
their right to challenge any decision by the Commission through the courts, they gave
him the power to be the final arbiter of all disputes involving the leagues, clubs, and
players, and they permitted him to impose whatever sanctions he deemed appropriate in
the circumstances; thus the extensive powers of a sport Commissioner were born.63 US
professional sports Commissioners have retained much of this power as situations stand
today, with very rare challenges to their authority being held as valid.64

57

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 56.

58

Id. at 67.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 76.

61

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 76.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 78; see Milwaukee American Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931)
(stating that both the history of the Commissioner’s office and the language of the baseball code gave him
nearly unlimited discretion to determine whether certain conduct conflicted with the game’s best interests
and to determine the appropriate sanction); see also Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir., 1978) (holding
that the district court was correct in determining that the Commissioner was still vested with the power to
decide whether any action was in the best interests of the game and to take whatever remedial action he
considered justifiable); but see Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 9528,
2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (holding that the Commissioner’s decision was open for review,
thus restricting, however slightly, the powers of the Commissioner).
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In one of the most critical decisions involving antitrust law as applied to sports
law, the 8th Circuit in Mackey v. National Football League established a three-prong test
which established a “non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust laws.”65 Collective
bargaining agreements in sports are exempt from antitrust laws as long as (1) the
restraints on trade primarily affect only the parties to the agreement, (2) the issues
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and (3) the agreement was reached
through a collective bargaining process.66 This test was adopted by other circuits and
eventually confirmed by the US Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. when the
Court reasoned that in order for effective collective bargaining to take place in sports as
in any other industry, “some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining
process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions.”67
This non-statutory exemption has a very different impact on sports’ labor
agreements than it does on other industries.68 In a majority of industries, workers join
unions to gain wages which would be higher than they would be paid in a free market
where workers with the same skill set are competing with one another for limited job
opportunities.69 Sports unions, on the other hand, were established as a result of the
owners’ anticompetitive practices such as salary caps,70 player drafts,71 and reserve

65

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 82; Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)
(professional football players sued the NFL and commissioner alleging that league rule requiring a team
acquiring a player whose contract had expired to pay the player's former team compensation violated the
Sherman Act and the court held that professional sports collective bargaining agreements are exempt from
antitrust laws if they satisfy a three-prong test).
66

Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.

67

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 82.; Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 US 231, 237 (1996).

68

Id. at 83.

69

Id.

70

Thomas C. Picher, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the Effect on Salary Cap
and Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 S ETON H ALL J. S PORTS L. 5, 37-38 (1997) (discussing how salary cap
provisions in professional sports establish maximum team salaries based on a predetermined percentage of
the defined gross revenues to the text of the note of the league. As defined gross revenues of the league
increase, the players' salaries increase at a rate proportional to the predetermined percentage).
71

John J. Siegfried, Sports Player Drafts and Reserve Systems, 14 C ATO J. 443-44 (1995) (describing a
sports draft as a process used to allocate certain players to sports teams. In a draft, teams take turns
selecting from a pool of eligible players. When a team selects a player, the team receives exclusive rights to
sign that player to a contract, generally for up to one year, and no other team in the league may sign the
player).
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clauses72 which allow owners to pay lower wages than players might command on the
open market, given the demand for their unique skill set.73
Sports’ unions accept these anticompetitive practices because the agreements they
enter into benefit them in other areas such as healthcare benefits, some ability to enter
free agency (a period in which an athlete can sign with any team because he or she is not
under contract with any one particular team), and guaranteed rookie salaries.74
Frequently, the argument in support of these anticompetitive practices is one of
“competitive balance.”75 Competitive balance, in sports terminology, is achieved when
all teams within a league are evenly matched with regard to playing ability.76
Competitive balance is achieved by preventing the wealthiest clubs from buying the best
players and dominating the competition.77 The idea is that, from an economic
perspective, a sports league should operate with a “profit-maximizing motive” which can
be achieved if their “product” appeals to consumers.78 James McKeown79 argues that
competitive balance implies “the ability to predict (or more specifically, not to predict)
the outcome of the match before the event begins or to predict the league champion
before the season is played...the success of a league requires that teams be relatively even
matched in terms of playing ability” and that this unpredictability will result in more
consumers being interested which results in higher profits.80
Chapter Six discusses how the threat of potential strikes, lockouts, and
decertification can push the two sides to a collective bargaining process to reach a
settlement lest they suffer conceivably irreparable harm.81 The 2011 NFL lockout and
subsequent union decertification is analyzed thoroughly in an effort to illustrate these
72

Siegfried, supra note 71, at 443 (reserve clauses “reserved” to the team the right to unilaterally impose a
new contract on a player if the team and formerly contracted player could not reach a mutual agreement for
a contract extension. This clause perpetuated a team’s right to a drafted player over the player’s entire
career.).
73

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 83.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 84.

76

Id. at 87.

77

Id. at 84.

78

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 87.

79

James T. McKeown is the Chair of the Antitrust practice group of Foley & Lardner, LLC and an Adjunct
Professor at Marquette University Law School. He was counsel of record for the Amici Responding
Economists in American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
80

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 87; James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports
Antitrust Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 521 (2011).
81

MCARDLE, supra note 1, at 100.
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strategic maneuvers. Specifically, in 2011, NFL team owners opted out of their current
collective bargaining agreement that was intended to run through 2013, stating that the
distribution of funds between players and teams no longer made financial sense.82 The
NFL players union was unwilling to accept the teams’ demand for changes to the split of
television monies because the teams did not provide any evidence that they were
struggling financially.83 Once the current agreement ended, NFL teams commenced a
lockout for the first time since 1987 in an effort to gain negotiating powers for a new
agreement, in which they wanted a larger portion of the league’s $9 billion annual
revenue.84
At the same time, the players union established a plan for decertifying their union,
which could allow their players to challenge the lockout through antitrust proceedings.85
This plan meant that this dispute moved beyond the agreement’s provisions for dispute
resolution and into the realm of court hearings and external mediation.86
An interesting result arising from the lockout/decertification period was White v.
National Football League.87 The litigation involved an agreement reached by the NFL to
the effect that television networks would pay the NFL “lockout insurance” of $4.5 billion
if the league and the players’ relationship broke down and resulted in a strike or lockout,
which would result in no games for the networks to televise.88 None of this money would
go to the players and the players argued that this contingency insurance provided the
teams with a financial stability which allowed them to commence the lockout and not
bargain in good faith.89 The case was eventually dismissed when the 2011 collective
bargaining agreement was agreed upon; however, the court did state that the 2006
collective bargaining agreement required the parties to seek to maximize total revenues
for the shared benefit of both parties; it is not permissible for one party to a collective
bargaining agreement to pursue its own interests at the expense of the other party.90
In July 2011, the parties agreed in principle to a new collective bargaining
agreement and the teams ended the lockout after a third and final mediation effort.91 This
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third mediation proceeding involved face-to-face dialogue and joint discussions, agreeing
not to discuss the mediation details with the media, and keeping lawyers out of the
process until as late as possible.92 This lockout and collective bargaining process serves
as an example of the benefits to be achieved with good faith dealings, even when the
parties’ relationship seems severely strained, as well as proving that mediation does have
a role in sports dispute resolution and that arbitration is not the only alternative to the
courts.93
Part Three is structured fairly well in that its chapters generally build off of one
another. For example, collective bargaining is discussed in Chapter Four and is then
further analyzed in relation to antitrust and competitive balance in Chapter Five. Chapter
Six brings collective bargaining to an appropriate conclusion by focusing on how residual
dissatisfaction at particular terms to collective bargaining agreements can lead to labor
disputes such as strikes, lockouts, and decertification while the collective bargaining
agreement is still in effect because both parties to the agreement want to jockey for a
stronger position and the other party prior to negotiating a renewal.
VI.

PART FOUR , CHAPTERS SEVEN THROUGH TEN : EUROPEAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN

SPORT

The focus in Chapter Seven shifts from a primarily US sports focus to European
sports and the unique issues facing European sports, laws, and dispute resolution.
Chapter Seven begins by examining the landscape of European sports following a case
that signified the end of sports’ quota systems and the restrictions on player movement,
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman
(“Bosman”).94
Homegrown player rules instituted by the Union of European Football
Associations (“UEFA”) bear a strong resemblance to quota systems95 that were banned
under Bosman.96 Clubs must submit a list of their 25-member squad prior to the start of a
tournament and the clubs must contain at least four “club-trained” players and four
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“association-trained” players, as of the 2009-2010 season.97 UEFA’s homegrown system
is an effort to address its concerns for competitive balance and the development of young
players while complying with Bosman.98 McArdle anticipates that there may be a
challenge to this rule in the future and that it will be “very hard to argue” that the Bosman
rules of recruiting and training young athletes have been addressed by the homegrown
player rules and that the rules’ benefits justify restricting athletes’ free movement.99
The discussion then shifts to salary caps within European sports.100 Within some
sports, salary caps have been regarded as a feasible means of securing “competitive
balance” and encouraging financial stability while being compliant with European law.101
The example of the Rugby Super League, however, indicates that, as with homegrown
player rules, there is no guarantee of either competitive balance or financial stability.102
Clubs have been permitted to breach their salary cap by £100,000 to attempt to prevent
their players from leaving the league in order to pursue better contracts in other
leagues.103 Salary caps can help keep a club internally competitive, but can harm the
quality of the league and make weaker leagues grow weaker.104
Chapter Eight discusses some of UEFA’s responses to Bosman and follows a
series of cases revolving around unilateral options for extensions, mainly in the context of
football.105 In the direct aftermath of Bosman, UEFA abolished their quota system and
the payment of transfer fees for players within the EU/EEA who moved when their
contracts concluded.106 It followed that clubs, in an attempt to circumvent this rule, began
to extend the lengths of proven players’ contracts, encouraged them to enter into new
contracts before the expiration of the existing contract, and sought to extract extremely
high transfer fees for players transferring while under contract.107
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As far as unilateral options for extensions are concerned, it has been the general
rule that CAS will not uphold unilateral contract extensions because persons will not be
compelled to perform an employment contract against their will.108 Unilateral contract
extensions, however, are not invalid as a matter of law; factors to be considered to
determine the validity of unilateral contract extensions include (1) if a player accepts a
previous extension without protest; (2) the period of extension coverage is reasonable;
and (3) if both the team and the player make concessions in the employment
agreement.109
In the past several years, young athletes in Europe and their international transfers
has increasingly become an issue.110 The 2001 FIFA Regulations provided that contracts
with minors (those under the age of eighteen) could not have a duration longer than three
years. Additionally, the Regulations barred clubs from within the EU/EEA from signing
minors who were not residents of an EU/EEA member state, unless the child had moved
to a member state for reasons not associated with football.111 These Regulations were
highly criticized for not protecting minors carefully enough, principally in respect of their
education and training. In 2005, Regulations established some improvements for youth
participants.112
A famous case regarding youth movement of football players into Europe was
heard by CAS in 2008 in FC Midtjylland v. FIFA, and is still the only case involving the
movement of third-country minors that has been heard by CAS.113 International transfer
of minor athletes can occur only in extremely rare circumstances, and the athletes in this
case were merely moving for football purposes.114 One such circumstance that would
allow for third-country movement of minors would be when an athlete moves for purely
educational purposes to pursue their studies.115
The new regulations (both in 2005 and 2010) have taken great strides to protect
youth participants in sports. The Regulations now require the Players’ Status Committee
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to create a subcommittee on the international transfers of minor players and to rule on the
status of those players between the ages of twelve and eighteen.116
Chapter Ten discusses European collective bargaining in sports and the impact
that McArdle thinks social dialogue can have on that process.117 Social dialogue in
Europe refers to discussions, consultations, negotiations, and joint actions involving
organizations representing the two sides of industry (employers and workers).118
McArdle refers to the movement towards the use of social dialogue in European sports as
a very important development.119 Social dialogue offers opportunities for influence and
contribution to develop not only policies that are beneficial to both clubs and athletes, but
also to develop structures that can help resolve disputes which impact upon their current
and future membership.120 Beyond the ability to develop dispute resolution structures,
social dialogue can help create significant changes to other areas of sports such as the
status and transfer of players, protection of minor athletes, image rights, pension funds,
etc.121 Finally, social dialogue can help impact recourse to CAS through internal systems
of dispute resolution should parties seek this review.122
Part Four highlights the similarities and differences facing sports in Europe
compared to the United States. Homegrown player rules as well as transfer rules are very
complex and pose serious legal issues for European sports teams, whereas United States
teams don’t “transfer” players under contract and don’t have limitations on the nationality
of the on their teams. This section serves as a great comparative analysis between sports
in the United States and Europe.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Dispute Resolution in Sport is a book designed to offer an understanding of the
relationship between law and arbitration as well as provide guidance on key
contemporary issues. McArdle excels at the latter objective through his use and
examination of timely issues, arbitral decisions, and court decisions. His examination of
Northwestern University’s players’ attempted unionization, the Jerry Sandusky scandal,
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and the Lance Armstrong doping cases, just to name a few, are extremely attractive to a
reader of this book because of the timeliness of the events. Almost all sports enthusiasts
are aware, on some level, of these events.
McArdle does a wonderful job at explaining the basics of relationship between the
law and arbitration, especially with regards to CAS. Chapter Two accomplishes
McArdle’s objective to show the intersection of law and arbitration better than any other
chapter in the book. By showing how and when sports organizations try to shield
themselves from oversight and review, McArdle uses brilliant examples to prove that
these organizations cannot entirely accomplish this, nor should they be able to
accomplish this goal. In general, courts will leave this oversight to sports dispute
resolution systems, such as CAS, as they are the experts in the field.
While this book is a fairly easy read, it lacks organization and can sometimes
leave the reader lost, even within a chapter, as McArdle jumps from topic to topic
without smooth transitions. While some chapters built off of the previous chapter(s),
others chapters lacked foundation that would provide guidance to the reader. This allows
for less retention of the previous topics and an sense of brokenness throughout the book.
I would recommend this book to any student, practitioner, or researcher working
or interested in sports law. Dispute Resolution in Sport is a must read in order to properly
stay abreast of the current issues affecting the field. In terms of the novice or recreational
sports law enthusiast, this book assumes prior knowledge of certain areas of the law or
sports and fails to lay a proper foundation and can leave the reader wanting for more
background.
Dispute Resolution in Sport successfully accomplishes its goals of elaborating on
the relationship between law and arbitration within the field of sports law. McArdle uses
contemporary issues to achieve that goal. This style of book could easily be replicated by
McArdle every few years to bring readers up-to-date on relevant topics in sports law.
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